Marquette Law Review
Volume 93
Issue 2 Symposium: Criminal Appeals: Past, Present,
and Future

Article 5

Justice on Appeal in Criminal Cases: A TwentiethCentury Perspective
Paul D. Carrington

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
Repository Citation
Paul D. Carrington, Justice on Appeal in Criminal Cases: A Twentieth-Century Perspective, 93 Marq. L. Rev. 459 (2009).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol93/iss2/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

JUSTICE ON APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASES:
A TWENTIETH-CENTURY PERSPECTIVE
PAUL D. CARRINGTON*
I welcome the opportunity to participate in this symposium so that I may
present once again, and not merely for old times‘ sake, a view of the role of
appellate courts that was once widely shared and has now been dismissed by
many judges as antique. I write chiefly of federal courts, but the same
considerations arise in the conduct of appeals in state courts.
THE 1976 SETTING
From 1971 to 1976, I worked with Dan Meador and Maurice Rosenberg,
and with a very elegant group of judges and lawyers organized as the
Advisory Council for Appellate Justice (Council or Advisory Council). Our
Council was summoned into being by the eminent Circuit Judge Al Murrah, 1
who was then the director of the new Federal Judicial Center. 2 Our Council
was also funded by the National Conference on State Courts 3 and the Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration.4 All of these organizations were
then of recent birth and reflected a widely shared ambition to erect a legal
system worthy of the Great Society that it was hoped America would
become. 5

* Professor of Law, Duke University. This Essay was presented to a Conference on Criminal
Appeals at Marquette University Law School on June 15, 2009. Sara Beale, Lisa Griffin, and
Michael Tigar offered very helpful comments. Todd Miller was very helpful in editing and in
locating the references.
1. His biography is VON RUSSELL CREEL ET AL., AMERICAN JURIST : THE LIFE OF JUDGE
ALFRED P. MURRAH (1996).
2. For a description of the role and functions of the center, see JOSEPH L. EBERSOLE, THE
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER: A NONTRADITIONAL ORGANIZATION IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY OF
THE UNITED STATES (1979).
3. For a history of the founding of this organization, see ERICK LOW, THE NATIONAL CENTER
FOR STATE COURTS : A COMMEMORATIVE HISTORY OF ITS STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION IN
HONOR OF 20 YEARS OF SERVICE TO THE STATE COURTS (1991).
4. For an account of this program conducted by the Department of Justice, see generally
MALCOLM M. FEELEY & AUSTIN D. SARAT, THE P OLICY DILEMMA: FEDERAL CRIME POLICY AND
THE LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION (1980).
5. For an account of that vision and its expiration, see ANDREW J.F. MORRIS, THE LIMITS OF
VOLUNTARISM : CHARITY AND WELFARE FROM THE NEW DEAL THROUGH THE GREAT SOCIETY
(2009); MARK A. SMITH, THE RIGHT TALK: HOW CONSERVATIVES TRANSFORMED THE GREAT
SOCIETY INTO THE ECONOMIC SOCIETY (2007); THE GREAT SOCIETY AND THE HIGH TIDE OF
LIBERALISM (Sidney M. Miksis & Jerome M. Mileur eds., 2005).
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Several years of regular meetings led to a large national conference in
1975 held in San Diego and attended by hundreds of the most eminent judges,
lawyers, and scholars in the nation. 6 So honorific was our guest list that Wade
McCree, an eminent circuit judge and member of the Council, and later
Solicitor General of the United States, 7 remarked that we would need a
mortally ill person to take responsibility for selecting those invited to attend
because he or she would be a target for revenge by hundreds of powerful
uninvited persons. Our conference was designed to elevate the profession‘s
understanding of what was happening to our appellate courts and to advance
the briefly stated views of the Council that were presented and discussed at
the conference. In 1976, Meador, Rosenberg, and I published a book, Justice
on Appeal, that was intended to express more fully views then widely if not
universally shared, not only by members of the Advisory Council, but by most
of the hundreds of eminent attendees at the Conference. This Essay is a
reflection on that work and what has happened to it.
I had myself previously conducted a study of the federal appellate process
for the American Bar Foundation. I was in that endeavor advised by an even
more revered group that included two presidents of the American Bar
Association (ABA), Bernard Segal8 and Leon Jaworski,9 and two of the most
eminent federal judges of the 1960s, Carl McGowan and Thurgood
Marshall.10 Our unanimous 1969 report was an anticipation of the later work
of the Advisory Council.11 By 1976, there had been two other studies of the
federal courts12 that, like the Bar Foundation study, concluded that the federal
appellate system needed radical reform to protect the integrity of the system
of correcting errors in both civil and criminal proceedings in United States
District Courts, a system that had been established in the preceding century.
The efforts of the Bar Foundation group and the Advisory Council
6. The conferees were presented with ample readings. See APPELLATE JUSTICE: 1975 (Paul D.
Carrington et al. eds., 1975) (five volumes published by the National Center for State Courts).
7. For a personal commentary on Judge McCree, see Sara Sun Beale, Wade H. McCree, Jr., 86
MICH. L. REV. 217 (1987).
8. See Robert McG. Thomas Jr., Bernard G. Segal Dies at 89; Lawyer for Rich and Poor, N.Y.
TIMES, June 5, 1997, at B16.
9. See generally LEON JAWORSKI, CONFESSION AND AVOIDANCE : A MEMOIR (1979).
10. There are, of course, numerous biographies of Justice Marshall. None seem very attentive
to his career as a circuit judge. But see RANDALL WALTON BLAND, JUSTICE THURGOOD
MARSHALL: CRUSADER FOR LIBERALISM : HIS JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY (1908–1993), at 183–200
(2001).
11. AM. BAR FOUND., ACCOMMODATING THE WORKLOAD OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF
APPEALS (1968).
12. COMM‘N ON REVISION OF THE FED. COURT APPELLATE SYS., STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL
PROCEDURES : RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE, reprinted at 67 F.R.D. 195 (1975) (known as the
Hruska Report); FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE CASELOAD OF THE
SUPREME COURT, reprinted at 57 F.R.D. 573 (1972) (known as the Freund Report).
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proceeded from shared premises. We were all, in some sense, members of the
celebrated Great Society that promised ―justice to all.‖ By that phrase, we
intended transparent enforcement of all legal rights. We assumed that every
citizen charged with a serious crime was entitled, if he or she wanted, to a
public trial by jury at which competent counsel would defend the accused. 13
We also assumed that the offender had a right to subject the conduct of that
proceeding to further scrutiny by high-ranking judges who would, in public,
bring their mature and disinterested wisdom directly to bear on their
assessment of the fairness of the public trial. Indeed, we thought that citizens
of the Great Society were equally entitled to know who was responsible for
punishments imposed by law and the factual basis for their decisions.
Transparency at all levels was in this shared view a moral and political
imperative.
Meador, Rosenberg, and I explained our insistence on transparency on
appeal:
Appellate justice should be a model for the government‘s
dealings with citizens. Appellate courts are the most
dignified and receptive authorities to which individuals can
turn to express their legal dissatisfactions in a pointed way,
with assurance of a direct response. If these courts do not
deal directly with litigants, we cannot expect agencies or
bureaucracies of lesser sensitivity to legal rights to do so. It
is therefore important that justice on appeal be visible to all. 14
We legal scholars of the Great Society were of course aware that the right
to appeal a criminal conviction was not written in stone. Why, our forebears
in the nineteenth century might have asked, should we bother to allow appeals
from criminal convictions? Pursuant to the prohibition on double jeopardy
stated in the Fifth Amendment, 15 the forebears did not allow the states or the
federal government to appeal acquittals. And the role of the judiciary in
making criminal law through utterances in opinions of the court must be at
best modest. Our federal and state constitutions leave little, if any, room for
the enforcement of criminal law not enacted by legislatures but made by
judges in the common law manner.16 If Congress, or a state legislature, has
13. The right to counsel emerged in the Scottsboro case in 1932. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45, 73 (1932).
14. PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET AL., JUSTICE ON APPEAL, at v (1976).
15. ―[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb.‖ U.S. CONST. amend. V.
16. Ben Rosenberg discusses the lack of federal criminal common law, while noting several
exceptions. Ben Rosenberg, The Growth of Federal Criminal Common Law, 29 AM. J. CRIM. L. 193,
202 (2002) (―There is no federal criminal common law. But there is.‖). Most states have similarly
attempted to codify common law crimes. For a brief account of this development, see Francis Barry
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not clearly stated the prohibitions they mean to impose on our conduct, a court
has no business prescribing new principles of criminal law. And in the
nineteenth century, the procedural rights of those charged with a crime were
few, save the right to trial by jury. 17 Given all these circumstances, there was
not much a convicted defendant could have said, had his appeal been
permitted. It was also a likely comfort to those concerned with federal law
that there were few federal laws and few federal prosecutions.
The view of the appellate process voiced by many of us in the age of the
Great Society was first expressed in the late nineteenth century in response to
this absence of appellate review. The Judiciary Act of 188918 first established
the right to appeal a conviction in federal court, but that right was for the
moment limited to capital cases. In 1891, the right to appeal was extended to
all convictions imposed by district courts, and the courts of appeals were
established to provide a forum for review of all civil and criminal judgments
of the district courts,19 thereby constraining the exercise of what had been
decried as the ―kingly power‖ of the trial judges in federal courts. 20 The
purpose, indeed the only purpose, of those responsible for creating the United
States Circuit Courts of Appeals was to provide a system of public
accountability for federal trial judges; it was only for that reason that
Congress established appellate courts whose job, indeed whose only job,
would be not only to correct judges‘ errors but to affirm and support their
contested decisions. 21 That remains a vital mission of the appellate court. 22 In
1897, six years after their establishment, the Circuit Courts of Appeals were
given exclusive responsibility for the review of federal convictions.23 That
responsibility was enlarged by the Judiciary Act of 1925,24 which greatly

McCarthy, Crimes of Omission in Pennsylvania, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 633, 659–62 (1995) (describing
the history of legality).
17. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 6; MINN. CONST. art. I,
§ 6; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 24; VA. CONST. art. I, § 8.
18. Act of Feb. 6, 1889, ch. 113, § 6, 25 Stat. 656, 656.
19. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, §§ 2, 5, 26 Stat. 826, 826–28.
20. 21 CONG. REC. 3404 (1890) (remarks of Rep. David Browning Culberson); see also FELIX
FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 88 (1928) (―No
wonder that extravagant language, descriptive of tyranny, was employed by responsible lawyers to
characterize the powers wielded at this time by a single federal judge!‖).
21. Indeed, the sole purpose of that Act was to provide a system for correcting error. See 21
CONG REC. 3407–08, 10,221–22 (1890) (remarks of Rep. William Campbell Preston Breckinridge
and remarks of Sen. William Maxwell Evarts, respectively). On the continuing centrality of that
purpose, see Chad M. Oldfather, Error Correction, 85 IND. L.J. 49 (2010).
22. For elaboration of the point, see Paul D. Carrington, The Power of District Judges and the
Responsibility of Courts of Appeals, 3 GA. L. REV. 507 (1969). But see Charles Alan Wright, The
Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L. REV. 751, 779–81 (1957).
23. Act of Jan. 20, 1897, ch. 68, 29 Stat. 492.
24. Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936, 936–39.
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extended the Supreme Court‘s discretion to deny petitions for certiorari,
thereby leaving the error-correction task entirely to the intermediate courts.25
It was not until the second half of the twentieth century that the federal
and state constitutions, bearing on criminal punishments in state courts,
became major features of criminal procedure. 26 The federal constitutional
provisions had come to be enforced in state court proceedings by means of
habeas corpus proceedings in federal courts.27 This evolution of procedural
rights greatly increased the complexity and importance of procedural rulings
prior to trial;28 the evolution elevated the importance of effective review of all
federal convictions, and also appellate review of collateral proceedings in
which the constitutionality of state court convictions are assessed by federal
district courts. Pretrial rulings today also include rulings enforcing numerous
rights of non-parties pursuant to the Crime Victims‘ Rights Act of 2004. 29
The task assigned to the reviewing court is thus not only to assure the public
of the sufficiency of evidence presented at trial, but also to certify compliance
with all the many procedural rules enacted or imposed by constitutions or
legislation to prevent the abuse of power by governments and prosecutors.
Forty years ago, the leadership of the profession regarded this complex task as
the defining mission of our appellate judges in criminal cases.
The federal courts‘ function of reviewing criminal proceedings in state
courts pursuant to petitions for writs of habeas corpus has been limited
somewhat by Congress,30 but remains significant. The Supreme Court has
lately had to remind courts of appeals that their grudging review of capital
cases fails to meet even the minimal standards Congress has put in place. 31
25. See Arthur D. Hellman, Error Correction, Lawmaking, and the Supreme Court’s Exercise
of Discretionary Review, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 795, 797–98 (1983); cf. Rogers v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 352
U.S. 500, 524–25 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court‘s exercise of jurisdiction
―in the name of ‗doing justice‘ in individual cases‖).
26. For a brief account of the constitutional law developments, see Developments in the Law—
The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1324, 1367–98 (1982).
27. 28 U.S.C. § 2245 (2006). On the advent of federal review of state convictions in habeas
corpus proceedings, see generally Evelyn L. Wilson, Federal Habeas Corpus: An Avenue of Relief
for State Prisoners, 18 S.U. L. REV. 1 (1991); Brian M. Hoffstadt, The Deconstruction and
Reconstruction of Habeas, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1125 (2005).
28. On appellate review of pretrial rulings in criminal cases, see 15B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT,
ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL P RACTICE AND PROCEDURE 2D § 3919
(2d ed. 1991).
29. Scott Campbell, Stephanie Roper, Wendy Preston, Louarna Gillis, and Nila Lynn Crime
Victims‘ Rights Act, tit. I, Pub. L. No. 108-405, 118 Stat. 2261 (2004) (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. § 3771 (2006)).
30. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, tit. I,
§ 101, 110 Stat. 1214, 1217 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2006)).
31. See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240, 266 (2005). One such case has been twice
remanded to the Fifth Circuit. Penry v. Lynaugh (Penry I), 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989); Penry v.
Johnson (Penry II), 532 U.S. 782, 804 (2001).
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But the Court has also been quick to punish habeas corpus petitioners for
procedural fumbles, and thus shield the courts of appeals from the burden of
hearing their petitions. For example, the fact that a federal judge, in the
presence of the state‘s attorney, informed a petitioner that he would have until
Friday to file an appeal, did not excuse the petitioner‘s failure to file on
Tuesday, which was in fact the statutory deadline. 32
But even as we Great Society folk conferred in San Diego in 1975, two
other evolutions were in full swing and already challenging the ability and
suitability of the courts of appeals to perform the tasks of correcting errors in
criminal proceedings and assure us that the rights of accused persons and
crime victims were being appropriately observed. We conferees were then
fully aware of both of these trends.
One trend was a growing use of federal criminal law to regulate more
forms of misconduct, most notably in regard to the sale and use of ―controlled
substances,‖ resulting in ever-increasing criminal dockets in federal district
courts and appellate caseloads in the courts of appeals. That effort had
commenced in 1909 but was not declared a war on drugs until 1970. 33 As a
―war‖ it was lost long ago, 34 but its costs to the legal system continue. Its
continuing enlargement increased the federal criminal caseload and pressed
judges to abbreviate the attention they gave to criminal appeals. Meador,
Rosenberg, and I observed in 1976:
What we have articulated as the imperatives of appellate
justice stand in the way of many procedures that would
heighten efficiency. In their commendable efforts to stay
abreast of unprecedented workloads, some appellate courts
have gone too far in curtailing oral argument, bypassing
conferences, and deciding appeals with unexplained orders. 35
There was also another evolution underway in 1976 that tended to demean
the task of correcting and thus preventing errors in the enforcement of
criminal law. It was the increasing tendency of United States circuit judges to
invest their efforts in opportunities to make national law as expressed in
published opinions of the court. Indeed, our legal institutions and profession
were becoming increasingly committed to the idea that the primary

32. Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 207–08, 214 (2007); see also Scott Dodson, Mandatory
Rules, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1, 6–8 (2008).
33. For an account, see DOUGLAS VALENTINE, THE STRENGTH OF THE WOLF: THE SECRET
HISTORY OF AMERICA‘S W AR ON DRUGS (2004); see also Opium Exclusion Act, Pub. L. No.
60-221, 35 Stat. 614 (1909).
34. JAMES P. GRAY, WHY OUR DRUG LAWS HAVE FAILED AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT :
A JUDICIAL INDICTMENT OF THE WAR ON DRUGS 13 (2001).
35. CARRINGTON ET AL., supra note 14, at 41.
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professional mission of appellate judges is to make law as illuminated in the
signed and published opinions of their courts.36
At least in the federal system, as a consequence of these two foreseen and
continuing developments, the humble tasks of correcting the errors of lower
courts and certifying the quality of justice provided there were no longer
deemed to be primary, or even important, missions of federal appellate judges.
This role transformation was confirmed by the creation of the en banc hearing
designed to produce opinions expressing the ―law of the circuit.‖37 Writing
opinions became the dominant mission of the circuit judges. A difficult moral
and ethical challenge is posed for a federal circuit judge who assigns to
himself professional responsibility for the correctness of every judgment that
he is called upon to review. 38
Certainly, the Supreme Court of the United States is a negative role model
for the lower courts in this respect, dismissive as it is of most of its potential
workload. The Justices are increasingly relaxed in choosing to review fewer
and fewer cases, writing longer and longer opinions declaratory of their
shared views on national policies, and enjoying more time away from their
professional duties. In 1925, the Supreme Court was deciding roughly 300
appeals a year;39 it is now down to as few as 87.40 Never mind conflicts in the
laws of the circuit. Let troublesome questions of national law percolate in the
circuits41 perhaps indefinitely, or at least until those questions attract the
interest of at least four Justices 42 as informed by their law clerks.43

36. For an economic analysis of this evolution, see Steven Shavell, On the Design of the
Appeals Process: The Optimal Use of Discretionary Review Versus Direct Appeal, 39 J. LEGAL
STUD. 63 (2010).
37. A. Lamar Alexander, Jr., Note, En Banc Hearings in the Federal Courts of Appeals:
Accommodating Institutional Responsibilities (Part I), 40 N.Y.U. L. R EV. 563, 582 (1965); Paul D.
Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the Function of Review and
the National Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 542, 580–81 (1969); see Henry J. Friendly, The “Law of the
Circuit” and All That, 46 ST. JOHN ‘S L. REV. 406 (1972).
38. See Stephen B. Burbank, Judicial Accountability to the Past, Present, and Future:
Precedent, Politics and Power, 28 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 19, 46 (2005); Alex Kozinski, The
Real Issues of Judicial Ethics, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1095 (2004). But see B.E. WITKIN, MANUAL ON
APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS § 10, at 14–17 (1977).
39. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 20, at 301 n.2, 302 tbl.I (showing 209 cases disposed
of by written opinion and 83 per curiam decisions).
40. JAMES C. DUFF, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 80 tbl.A-1 (2010) [hereinafter 2009
U.S. COURTS REPORT]. This is the number of cases argued during the 2008 term. The number may
be higher for the 2009 term.
41. For a favorable assessment of this scheme, see generally Arthur D. Hellman, Light on a
Darkling Plain: Intercircuit Conflicts in the Perspective of Time and Experience, 1998 SUP. CT. REV.
247 (1998); see also Arthur D. Hellman, Never the Same River Twice: The Empirics and
Epistemology of Intercircuit Conflicts, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 81, 92–106 (2001).
42. SUP. CT. R. 10. While the Rules do not indicate the precise methodology for granting

466

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[93:459

Perhaps I exaggerate the degree to which circuit judges adhere to the role
model the Justices provide. 44 I have not myself been sitting on any appellate
court. But my clear sense is that the task of correcting errors in trial courts, or
in courts of first instance as Europeans tend to designate them, is a task
increasingly deemed unworthy of the attention of federal circuit judges. The
task seems one to be delegated, if possible, to staff lawyers or law clerks
holding no commissions to make judicial decisions and who are anonymous
in the sense that they take no public responsibility for their work. On that
account, the eminent Circuit Judge Donald Lay was moved to urge that
federal appellate jurisdiction be made entirely discretionary, 45 as it is in state
courts in Virginia and West Virginia.46 Professor Steven Shavell, calling
attention to the costs savings to all involved, proposes that appellants be
allowed to confer such discretion on the appellate court.47
My impression that our appellate courts have become entranced with their
lawmaking role and repelled from their mundane and routine error-correction
role was reinforced by discussions at the 2005 conference of state and federal
appellate judges conducted by the American Academy of Appellate
Lawyers.48 Many federal circuit judges appeared to be invigorated by the
importance of their duty to make the law of the circuit49—the role delegated to
them by a Supreme Court that has forsaken its own longstanding
responsibility to unify and harmonize the administration of our national law 50
certiorari, a minimum of four Justices must agree to grant certiorari. For an explanation and
discussion of the origins of the ―Rule of Four,‖ see Richard L. Revesz & Pamela S. Karlan,
Nonmajority Rules and the Supreme Court, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1067, 1068–73 (1988).
43. TODD C. PEPPERS, COURTIERS OF THE MARBLE P ALACE : THE RISE AND INFLUENCE OF
THE SUPREME COURT LAW CLERK 191–205 (2006); ARTEMUS W ARD & DAVID L. WEIDEN,
SORCERERS‘ APPRENTICES: 100 YEARS OF LAW CLERKS AT THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
109–49 (2006).
44. But see RICHARD A. P OSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 102–09 (1985).
45. Donald P. Lay, A Proposal for Discretionary Review in Federal Courts of Appeals, 34 SW.
L.J. 1151, 1155 (1981).
46. The Supreme Court of Virginia does not allow an appeal of right except under limited
circumstances. Virginia Courts in Brief, http://www.courts.state.va.us/courts/cib.pdf (last visited
June 16, 2010); the Supreme Court of Appeals, West Virginia‘s only appellate court, has entirely
discretionary review. The West Virginia Judicial System, http://www.state.wv.us/wvsca/
wvsystem.htm (last visited June 16, 2010).
47. Shavell, supra note 36, at 70–75.
48. For an account of the conference program, see Arthur D. Hellman, The View from the
Trenches: A Report on the Breakout Sessions at the 2005 National Conference on Appellate Justice,
8 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 141 (2006).
49. See Lauren K. Robel, Caseload and Judging: Judicial Adaptation to Caseload, 1990 BYU
L. REV. 3, 44–47 (1990); THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE PROBLEMS OF
THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 34–37 (1994); POSNER, supra note 44, at 151–52.
50. See Thomas E. Baker & Douglas D. McFarland, The Need for a New National Court, 100
HARV. L. REV. 1400, 1406 (1987); COMM ‘N ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FED .
COURTS OF APPEALS, FINAL REPORT (1998).
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to assure, for example, that we all pay the same taxes. 51 Often to be heard at
the 2005 conference were judicial expressions of disdain for many of the
cases judges are expected to decide which they deem unworthy of their
attention. Many attributed the lengths of their dockets to the neglect or
incompetence of counsel.
The attraction of appellate judges to their lawmaking role is not, to be
sure, a novelty discovered in the late twentieth century. That impulse to make
law and public policy can be identified with the origins of the common law
tradition in which explicit legislation was largely absent. But English
common law judges did not write and publish opinions of their courts; they
expressed their views of the law only orally and individually. It was the
Marshall Court in 1801 that introduced the concept of the opinion of the Court
as an institutionalized statement signed and published by some or all the
Justices to overtly prescribe legal principles to govern the future conduct of
officials and citizens.52 It did not thereafter take long for American
electorates to recognize that their judges were competing with elected
legislatures for the role of sovereign lawmaker. One response was the
revision of state constitutions to provide for the election of judges. 53 If the
people were to presume to govern themselves, they would have to govern
their judges. In many states, we elect our judges because we know that they
make as well as enforce our law. Elected judges publish opinions of the court
in part to validate their elections.
The nineteenth century in the United States was also a time of continuous
debate over codification. David Dudley Field was a leader of those who
favored comprehensive codification54 similar to the European civil law

51. See Erwin N. Griswold, The Need for a Court of Tax Appeals, 57 HARV. L. REV. 1153,
1158–64 (1944).
52. The first appearance of the opinion of the Court came in the first decision rendered after the
appointment of Chief Justice John Marshall. The story is told in GEORGE LEE HASKINS &
HERBERT A. JOHNSON, FOUNDATIONS OF POWER: JOHN MARSHALL, 1801–15, at 382–87 (1981).
There was a precedent for such a device in the opinions of the Privy Council giving advice to the
Crown, but the Council was not primarily a judicial institution, at least until the Privy Council
Appeals Act of 1832. 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 92 (Eng.); SELECT COMM. ON THE APPELLATE JURISDICTION,
REPORT, 1872, H.L., at 27 (1872); see generally John P. Dawson, The Privy Council and Private Law
in the Tudor and Stuart Period (pt. II), 48 MICH. L. REV. 627 (1950).
53. ARNDT M. STICKLES, THE CRITICAL COURT STRUGGLE IN KENTUCKY 1819–1829 (1929);
FREDERICK GRIMKE, THE NATURE AND TENDENCY OF FREE INSTITUTIONS 444–75 (John William
Ward ed., 1968); EVAN HAYNES, THE SELECTION AND TENURE OF JUDGES 80 (1944) (―[W]ithin a
short twenty years, the states of this Union, taken as a whole, abandoned the practice of the rest of
the civilized world, and amended their constitutions so as to provide for popular election of judges, to
hold office for short terms of years.‖). For details, see HAYNES, supra, at 101–35.
54. See David Dudley Field, Reasons for Adoption of the Codes (Feb. 19, 1873), in
1 SPEECHES, ARGUMENTS, AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD 361, 361, 365–
66 (A.P. Sprague ed., New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1884).
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tradition so that elected legislators would make the most of the law. 55 The
anti-codification position was advanced by the professional elite, including
James Coolidge Carter56 and James Barr Ames, 57 who supposed that wiser and
more coherent law could, and would, evolve from the published opinions of
appellate judges unobstructed by clumsy statutory texts crafted by common
folk. Theirs was a position that fit with the ambitions of the emerging
organized bar and the nascent legal academy; it served to justify not only their
existence as learned professionals and scholars, but also their claim to
elevated status. Enthusiasm for judicial lawmaking was surely reinforced by
the case method of teaching law advanced by Christopher Columbus Langdell
in the last decades of the nineteenth century. 58 In the view thus advanced,
well-educated and professionally disciplined lawyers can be expected to make
better national law, one judicial opinion at a time, than can mere lay
congressmen. A secondary consequence of this infectious disdain of the
democratic legislative process is that it distracts appellate judges from their
primary but more mundane task of correcting errors committed by lower
courts.
Indeed, by the second half of the twentieth century, our judiciary could be
seen as ―the ‗ascendant‘ branch‖59 of the federal government. For the most
part, mistrust and disdain of legislative enactments, and confidence in the
wisdom and integrity of the judiciary and the elite profession of which it is a
part, emerged as a central and defining feature of our national legal system.
Understandably, therefore, the lawmaking duty is an article of faith for
American appellate judges, and it seriously diminishes their interest in and
commitment to their duties as error correctors.
Associated, perhaps inevitably, with that diminution has been the
contemporaneous decline in the concern even of trial judges for getting the
disputed facts right, and assuring the public that they have done so. The ADR
movement, 60 with its commitment to privacy in the resolution of disputes, has
perhaps contributed to this evolution away from transparency in public
55. Michael E. Tigar, Comment, Automatic Extinction of Cross-Demands: Compensatio from
Rome to California, 53 CAL. L. REV. 224, 252–57 (1965).
56. See Lewis A. Grossman, Langdell Upside-Down: James Coolidge Carter and the
Anticlassical Jurisprudence of Anticodficiation, 19 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 149, 151–52 (2007).
57. Ames opposed the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law and maybe the formation of the
Commission on Uniform State Laws. See James Barr Ames, The Negotiable Instruments Law,
14 HARV. L. REV. 241 (1900).
58. See ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S
TO THE 1980S, at 51–63 (2001).
59. Marcia Coyle, Court Is the “Ascendant” Branch, For Now, NAT ‘L L.J., Aug. 6, 2001, at C7
(quoting Seth Waxman, former Solicitor General of the United States).
60. See Deborah R. Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves: How the Alternative Dispute Resolution
Movement Is Re-Shaping Our Legal System, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 165 (2003).
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adjudication. Others have vigorously protested the vanishing trial. 61 The
public trial was and remains the primary instrument of public accountability. 62
The public could attend trials, see legal decision making, and know who was
personally responsible for judgments, whether civil or criminal. And it was
afforded at least some access to the error-correction process through public
appellate hearings and published opinions. Alas, the absence of such public
proceedings leaves us without such knowledge. We should worry about that.
At least in federal courts, final judgments are now often largely the work
product of a bureaucracy.63 The chambers of federal district judges have
expanded to make room for an array of others, including law clerks, staff
lawyers, and magistrate judges, who were not appointed by the President nor
confirmed by the Senate, but who do much of their court‘s work. The visible
deed of the judge, if any, is often limited to a mere signature accepting the
recommendations and legal opinions expressed by lesser officers of the
judicial staff.64 Indeed, the Supreme Court has approved the use of partydrafted findings of fact in civil cases, so that all a judge need do to dispose of
many cases is just say yes and sign his or her name. 65
Similar delegations are made by circuit judges to their law clerks and to
growing central staffs. Their decisions are often unpublished and even
unsigned. This trend, already visible in 1975, was a subject of regret to our
Advisory Council. 66 Owen Fiss in 1983 captured the concern by linking it to
Hannah Arendt‘s concern about a social order subject to ―Rule by Nobody.‖ 67
Judge Harry Edwards, in response to this concern, offered a reassurance that
the quality of judicial work is not impaired by the use of talented law clerks,
but he acknowledged that at some point, excessive delegation of judicial
power undermines public confidence in the institutions.68 And the measures
61. See ROBERT P. BURNS, THE DEATH OF THE AMERICAN TRIAL (2009); Marc Galanter, The
Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in State and Federal Courts,
1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 526 (2004); Patrick E. Higginbotham, So Why Do We Call Them
Trial Courts?, 55 SMU L. REV. 1405, 1422–23 (2002).
62. Judith Resnik, Uncovering, Disclosing, and Discovering How the Public Dimensions of
Court-Based Processes Are at Risk, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 521, 565–70 (2006) (emphasizing the
continuing importance of public access, particularly in the face of the ADR movement).
63. See generally JUDITH A. MCKENNA ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., CASE MANAGEMENT
PROCEDURES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS (2000).
64. Patrick E. Higginbotham, A Few Thoughts on Judicial Supremacy: A Response to
Professors Carrington and Cramton, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 637, 648–49 (2009).
65. See, e.g., Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 572–73 (1985).
66. Wade H. McCree, Jr., Bureaucratic Justice: An Early Warning, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 777,
787 (1981).
67. Owen M. Fiss, The Bureaucratization of the Judiciary, 92 YALE L.J. 1442, 1452–53 (1983).
68. Harry T. Edwards, The Rising Work Load and Perceived “Bureaucracy” of the Federal
Courts: A Causation-Based Approach to the Search for Appropriate Remedies, 68 IOWA L. REV. 871,
882, 889 (1983).
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of delegation to central staff seem steadily to have increased since his
reassurance,69 steadily diminishing the professional responsibility, moral duty,
and individual accountability of the appellate judge. As Fiss noted, this trend
corresponds to similar trends in other institutions, private as well as public.
While our federal district and circuit courts have become increasingly
bureaucratized in their administration of private civil, as well as criminal, law,
that trend appears to be stronger in federal criminal proceedings. A radical
transformation of the legal process in criminal cases was achieved by
congressional enactments specifying and lengthening the sentences to be
imposed on convicted persons and providing more complex degrees of
criminality, 70 thus establishing very strong inducements to the negotiation of
guilty pleas.71 Convictions resting on guilty pleas of course lack transparency
and afford little basis for the exercise of appellate jurisdiction. It is
increasingly a brave accused who denies guilt and demands the right to a
public trial, whether by a judge or a jury.
The discretion of the district judge in sentencing was partially restored in
2005 by the Supreme Court,72 but the statutory Federal Sentencing Guidelines
still confine the choices open to the sentencing judge.73 Appeals protesting
excessive sentences are common, but the prosecution may also appeal a
sentence it deems too light.74 An ―abuse of discretion‖ standard is applied.
The degree of adherence to the Guidelines varies among districts and between
circuits.75 It seems fair to say that the role of the courts of appeals is modest,
and seldom is the occasion for transparent public proceedings.
Our 1975 National Advisory Council on Appellate Justice was aware of,
and resistant to, the trend of appellate judges to focus an ever-greater share of
energy and intellect on their politically engaged lawmaking function, to the
detriment of their error-correction functions. We were also aware of the
growing tendency of Congress to enact more and more criminal laws as

69. BAKER, supra note 49, at 143–46; Mary Lou Stow & Harold J. Spaeth, Centralized
Research Staff: Is There a Monster in the Judicial Closet?, 75 JUDICATURE 216 (1992).
70. See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (2009).
71. Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1471,
1472–76 (1993).
72. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233–34 (2005) (Stevens, J.) (acknowledging
that the Court has ―never doubted the authority of a judge to exercise broad discretion in imposing a
sentence within a statutory range‖); id. at 245 (Breyer, J.) (addressing Booker‘s second constitutional
question and rendering the previously mandatory Guidelines ―advisory‖).
73. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 353 (2007); Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49–
50 (2007); Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 108–09 (2007).
74. E.g., United States v. Livesay, 525 F.3d 1081, 1087 (11th Cir. 2008).
75. NORMAN ABRAMS & SARA SUN BEALE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT
240–41 (4th ed. Supp. 2008).
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expressions of their disapproval of conduct deemed to be antisocial. 76 We
were striving to resist the manifest effects of these developments on our
shared aim of assuring transparency and accountability in the law enforcement
process.
It is fair to say that in our time, we lost. The vanishing trial has been
accompanied by the vanishing appellate hearing, 77 and even perhaps the
vanishing review by judges of the enforcement of federal criminal law. But
the need abides for transparency and public accountability of the appellate
judges responsible for correcting the errors of our former ―trial‖ courts in the
administration of criminal laws. That transparency is needed to provide
public assurance that our laws are being faithfully enforced by those
appointed or elected to enforce them. In this statement, I adhere to a view
expressed with Meador and Rosenberg in 1976, to wit, that
The central purpose of a criminal appeal is to insure that the
trial court decision was reached fairly and accurately. The
lack of precise uniformity in doctrinal application, though not
unimportant, is relatively of less concern. The appellate
court‘s mission is to provide assurance that the defendant was
convicted and sentenced on adequate evidence and without
prejudicial error at trial or in the preliminary proceedings. In
short, the chief function of a criminal appeal is to see that the
appellant was not done an injustice. 78
We were of course fully aware in 1976, as we are today, that many
criminal appeals are hopeless. A trial judge at our 1975 conference offered an
example we all considered and discussed. He described an appellant who
argued that a conviction should be reversed because the national flag was not
on display in the courtroom at the time of trial. And then, the informing judge
reported, counsel went on to advance his weaker arguments. How long, the
question was posed, should appellate judges, otherwise burdened with
important public responsibilities as lawmakers, have to listen to such trivial
arguments?
Our answer then, and my answer now, is, not long, but long enough.
76. A prescient recognition of the problem is Joseph R. Gusfield, On Legislating Morals: The
Symbolic Process of Designating Deviance, 56 CAL. L. REV. 54 (1968).
77. Compare Federal Court Statistics Are Reported, 54 A.B.A. J. 1096, 1096 (1968) (noting an
upward trend in appellate workload and a 15% increase in appeals), with LEONIDAS RALPH
MECHAM, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2000 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR:
JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 79–82 tbl.B-1 and 2009 U.S. COURTS REPORT,
supra note 40, at 82–85 tbl.B-1 (showing an 11.8% decrease over the past decade in the percentage
of cases disposed of by appellate hearings, from 9,752 to 8,593, despite a 25% uptick in the number
of appeals pending over the same time period).
78. CARRINGTON ET AL., supra note 14, at 58.
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Long enough to demonstrate to the world that someone appointed by the
President and confirmed by the Senate has heard and understood the
substance of the appellant‘s contention. Long enough to assure us that
responsibility for the decision has not been delegated to anonymous staff.
And that the judges appointed to perform the duty have, as we used to say,
―stood up in front of God and everybody‖ to say that, yes, this conviction was
correct. That should not take long. But it is not a duty adequately performed
merely by an instantaneous response or signature made on the advice of staff.
Responding to that challenge, the late, great Circuit Judge Richard Arnold, 79
sadly remarked that possessing 98% confidence that a case was rightly
decided below did not justify a practice of reading only 2% of the record on
appeal.80
The Supreme Court in 1967 had of course held that counsel for a criminal
appellant could acknowledge the absence of a plausible argument for reversal,
but only by means of a legal brief explaining the absence. 81 That practice
appears to abide. 82 But it is still a task for the appellate court to review that
brief, and staff can help. Several sitting judges reported to our Advisory
Council in 1975 that they had reversed convictions notwithstanding Anders
briefs filed to concede the cases.83 Whether the problems presented to counsel
appointed to appeal a hopeless case have since been resolved, it cannot be that
we have since found a means of disposing of hopeless criminal appeals
without the need for the public engagement of the court as advocated for by
the Advisory Council and advanced in our 1976 work.
The public interest continues to call for public exposure and
accountability, and therefore requires some form of oral argument in every
criminal appeal. 84 As Michael and Jane Tigar have affirmed, ―[o]ral argument
is always important and should never be waived.‖85 Given modern
79. His biography is P OLLY
THE FEDERAL BENCH (2009).

J. PRICE, JUDGE RICHARD S. ARNOLD : A LEGACY OF JUSTICE ON

80. Richard S. Arnold, Money, or the Relations of the Judicial Branch with the Other Two
Branches, Legislative and Executive, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 19, 34 (1996).
81. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).
82. It is presently a contestable issue whether that holding applies to proceedings leading to the
commitment of the accused to a mental institution. Joseph Frueh, The Anders Brief in Appeals from
Civil Commitment, 118 YALE L.J. 272, 291–92, 314–15 (2008).
83. CARRINGTON ET AL., supra note 14, at 77.
84. STANDARDS RELATING TO APP. CTS. § 3.35 (1994). But see Robert J. Martineau, The
Value of Appellate Oral Argument: A Challenge to the Conventional Wisdom, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1
(1986).
85. MICHAEL E. TIGAR & JANE B. TIGAR, FEDERAL APPEALS: JURISDICTION AND PRACTICE
§ 10.01, at 476 (3d ed. 1999) (emphasis added); see also Myron H. Bright & Richard S. Arnold, Oral
Argument? It May Be Crucial!, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1984, at 68, 69. But see Alvin B. Rubin, Does Law
Matter? A Judge’s Response to the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 307, 310
(1987).
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technologies, appellant‘s counsel need not come to the courthouse. 86 The
argument can be conducted electronically on a computer screen. But counsel,
or even a pro se appellant, seeking reversal should be required to state the
argument for reversal on the record and in a forum exposed to public scrutiny.
And at least one appellate judge should be seen, electronically if need be,
responding to the appellant‘s argument and taking personal responsibility for
any summary disposition. Thus, the lawyer making the sappy argument about
the absence of the flag in the courtroom, or one arguing that his case is
hopeless, should be obliged to present that argument or conclusion in person,
however shamefully, by a visible, transparent means. A real appellate judge,
one appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, should be
available publicly to ask counsel for a citation to a law requiring such a flag in
the courtroom before dismissing the appeal.
As our Great Society gang conceded decades ago, hopeless appeals should
not command full or prolonged attention. But the designation of an appeal as
unworthy of serious attention by judges is a decision not properly delegated
entirely to staff. And if an argument on the merits is advanced, it is
imperative that real judges be seen to hear and consider it.
We Great Society law reformers did see the need for support staff to
manage the flood of criminal appeals pursued by the new generation of
appointed defense counsel. Indeed, an important and recognized function of
support staff would be to provide quality control for appointed counsel, i.e., to
alert judges to inadequacies of performance by defense counsel, especially
those filing Anders briefs explaining their inability to make a serious
argument for reversal.
Thus, the central question I mean to propose for the twenty-first century is
whether, in federal courts, minimum standards of transparency and public
accountability are met in the resolution of criminal appeals. Are we assured
that convictions have been carefully and conscientiously reviewed by one or
more United States circuit judges who have taken personal responsibility for
affirmation of every conviction?
Can one circuit judge represent her court in transparently affirming a
conviction? I insist only on the absolute minimum of one such visible hearing
officer. On this point, I recall my 1969 dispute with the late Bernard Segal,
then the president of the ABA, who chaired the advisory committee on the
Bar Foundation study I was conducting. Bernie advised that an oral argument
before two circuit judges would suffice to meet minimal standards of
transparency. I obstinately insisted on a full panel of three circuit judges. 87
86. See Paul D. Carrington, Virtual Civil Litigation: A Visit to John Bunyan’s Celestial City, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 1516, 1525 (1998).
87. Carrington, supra note 37, at 561–63.
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As you see, I am now down to one. I can abide a process of review by one
member of the court of appeals if she (1) is actively and openly engaged in
responding to the appellant‘s arguments and (2) is empowered then to submit
the recorded public presentation to two colleagues who share responsibility
for the appellate disposition and who might possibly reopen the oral argument
if substantial issues are presented.
What we sought decades ago was assurance of transparency and
accountability in a process of adjudication of guilt. 88 I adhere to that purpose
and continue to oppose practices allowing criminal appeals to be papered over
by staff work so that those appointed by the President and confirmed by the
Senate give no more than glancing attention to the question of whether a
proceeding resulting in a conviction was properly conducted. It seems fair to
say that most federal criminal cases are no longer adjudicated but are resolved
by informal bargaining in a bureaucratic process. In deploring this
development, I do no more than repeat the thoughts of wise circuit judges who
have publicly protested the deterioration of the federal appellate process. 89
But let us not stop there. One should not be permitted to address issues of
criminal procedure without noting the demerits of our substantive criminal
law. The severity of the sentences prescribed by Congress that serve to
compel plea bargaining is highly objectionable, especially those severe
sentences imposed for violations of criminal laws imposed to control
substances. Congress seems too far removed from community life to
appreciate the human and family consequences of such severe sentencing.
We have, by far, more citizens in penitentiaries than any other nation.90 A
high percentage of those in prison are there for non-violent crimes—generally
for use or trafficking of substances that were lawful in the United States in the
nineteenth century. 91 These substances are, for most, less addictive than
88. See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 365–66
(1978).
89. E.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 128–29
(1996); Stephen Reinhardt, A Plea to Save the Federal Courts: Too Few Judges, Too Many Cases,
A.B.A. J., Jan. 1993, at 52; Higginbotham, supra note 64.
90. My own previous utterances on this point are found at Paul D. Carrington, The TwentyFirst Wisdom, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 333 (1995) and The Federal War on Drugs: Time for a
Reality Check?, 14 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 179 (1997). For a modern account of the War on Drugs
and its disparate impact on African-Americans, see Michael Tonry, Race and the War on Drugs,
1994 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 25 (1994).
91. There were 1,841,200 arrests for drug abuse violations in 2007, far outpacing the number of
arrests for each of the next five offenses. See Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Dep‘t of Justice,
Drugs
and
Crime
Facts:
Drug
Law
Violations
and
Enforcement,
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/dcf/enforce.cfm (last visited June 21, 2010). The greatest number of
arrests is for marijuana, a drug not made illegal until the early twentieth century. Id.; see Kristin J.
Balding, Comment, It Is a “War on Drugs” and It Is Time to Reload Our Weapons: An
Interpretation of 21 U.S.C. § 841, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1449, 1462–65 (1999) (detailing the history
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cigarettes or whiskey and have been in use elsewhere for a thousand or more
years. Did we learn nothing from the national experience with the abolition of
liquor? Can we not resist the impulse to criminalize every form of conduct
that a majority might strongly disapprove? I am skeptical that we can
establish a prudent and decent process of law enforcement as long as we insist
on criminalizing moral principles that many do not share and will not accept.
With that concession, I conclude that our commitment to due process and
respect for the rights of citizens requires an appellate process in criminal cases
that assures the public, as well as the accused, that our laws are being
faithfully and correctly enforced by judges lawfully designated to bear
responsibility for the laws‘ enforcement.

of marijuana and the federal government‘s efforts to curtail its use).

